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THE MACROECONOMIC POLICY ENVIRONMENT OF
PHILIPPINE AGRICULTURAL PERFORMANCE
Ponciano S. Intd, jr.
Agriculture and agricultural policies do not operate within a
vacuum. The macroeconomic environment strongly influences the
overall viability of agriculture and the effects of agricultural policy.
The paper discussesbriefly key aspectsof the macroeconomic en-
vironment that shape the pace and pattern of agricultural perform-
ance in the Philippines, namely, the macro price environment,
trade policy and the manufacturing sector, and the role of the
government. The paper suggestssomepolicy directions.
I. THE MACRO PRICE ENVIRONMENT (This section draws
heavily from Intal, David and Nelson 1985.)
The two most important macroeconomic prices for agricul-
ture and agricultural trade are the prices of capital and foreign ex-
change becausetheseare currently the scarcestresources. Both prices
are heavily influenced by the government's financial (i.e., budgetary
and monetary) policy.
The 1970s. The prices of capital and foreign exchange were
artificially lowered during the 1970's, hurting agriculture more
than other sectors.
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Becauseformal interest rates were not flexible during the 1970's
and i_flationary expectations were not reflected in the rates, real
interest rates were very low and at times negative. With the cheap
interest rate policy, the agricultural sector was at a disadvantage
compared with the nonagricultural sectors because of the greater
risk and higher transactions cost of agricultural lending. Indeed,
despite government subsidies of nonsugar agricultural lending
(through the Central Bank rediscount window at very low interest
rates), agricultural lending declined over the course of the 1970's
(David 1983).
The nominal exchange rate seldom adjusted to domestic infla-
tion, which made the domestic price of foreign exchange cheaper
(i.e., the peso was overvalued). By depressing the price of traded
goods, the overvaluation of the peso reduced the potential private
rate of return of investments in producing traded goods. Farmers
producing import substitutes faced increased competition from im-
ports (e.g., yellow corn imports vis-,_-vis domestically-produced
feeds). Farmers producing export goods received lower peso prices
for their exports than under a more appropriate exchange rate.
Because the agricultural sector produces a larger proportion of
traded (and tradable) goods than the industrial and service sectors,
the overvaluation of the peso adversely affected agriculture and
agricultural trade more than industry and services.
Moreover, the overvaluation of the peso resulted in the real
private cost of foreign borrowings being lessthan the social cost of
foreign borrowingS. This encouraged overborrowing compared to
•what was socially optimal. Finally, the low domestic interest rate
encouraged aninefficient utilization of domestic and foreign capital
resou rces.
The crisis and macro price policy. Aggregate demand restraint
isthe standardorthodox macroeconomic adjustment policy, together
with exchange rate depreciation, to correct external payments im-
balance. However, the burden of the macroeconomic adjustment
during the past two years was borne disproportionately by the sec-
tors which were the logical anchors for economic recovery; i.e.,
the private sector, agriculture, exports. This explains in part the
severity of the decline in real GNP in 1984 and the continued stag-
nation of the economy in 1985.
Monetary and fiscal policy during the latter 1983 and much of
1984 was more restrictive on the private sector than on the govern-INTAL: MACROECONOMIC POLICY ENVIRONMENT 397
ment.. During the critical period between September 1983 and
June 1984, for example, net domestic credits to the government
sector increasedby 72 percent while net domestic credits to the
financial sector declined by 28 percent. During this period, the
government continued to run budget deficits albeit to a lesserextent
than in 1981 and 1982. Because of the debt moratorium, thegovern-
ment was forced to raise capital locally to finance the deficits.
Given the aggregate monetary ceilings, the government domestic
borrowings resulted in the enormous increasein the formal interest
rate. Had the government deficits been reducedfurther, the Central
Bank would have been lessstringent in its credit policies vis-a-vis
the private sector and less aggressivein its sales of government
securities.
Agriculture and exports need a large working capital. Therefore
the increasein the interest rate hit the two sectorshard. In addi-
tion, the high interest rates dampened investment activity in agro-
based and export-related industries. (For the projects of doubtful
profitability which were initiated during the years of low interest
rates, the rise in the interest rates that resulted in the postpone-
ment or closureof the projects have little societal impact inasmuch
as such projects have become largely sunk costs to the economy.)
Furthermore, the high nominal interest rate artificially reduced the
pressure for exchange rate depreciation and thereby penalized
further the producersof agricultural tradablesand exportable manu-
factures.
Toward decreasing government deficits. The macroeconomic
policy environment most conducive to agricultural growth and
productivity requires flexibility in interest rates and exchange
ratescombined with a lessexpansionaryfinancial policy.
Given the monetary ceilings and constraints on government
borrowing from abroad, the government needs to reduce further
its deficits in order to reduce further the pressureon domestic in-
terest rates. This means a reduction in real expendituresand/or an
increasein real revenues.
Only a detailed analysis of the budget of the national govern-
ment and public enterpriseswill reveal the extent of the "fat" in
the expenditure plans that could be trimmed in order to reduce
further the budget deficit and thereby reduce the government
competition with the private sector for the _carcecredit resources.
Probably the best candidatesfor expenditure trimming are the subsi-398 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
dies and capital support of government enterprises. Government
corporate equity investment and net lending increased enormously
during 1981-82 when the government experienced record high
deficits. The continued budget deficits in 1984 aroseprimarily from
the sharp rise in government net lending, from 0.63 percent of GNP
in 1983 to 1.7 percent in 1984. There is a need therefore for an
examination of and a reduction in the number of government enter-
prises)
In the light of the depressed economy, it is unrealistic to raise
taxes from domestic sources in the short run. Nonetheless there are
two possible sources of revenues that the government may tap in
the short run. First, the government could go after the properties
abroad of individuals or groups whose companies, which borrowed
heavily at home or abroad with guarantees from government finan-
cial institutions, eventually soured. Government debt service is
one reason for the government deficit. The second possible source
of government revenue is to "tax" foreign soft loans to the Philip-
pines, especially project soft loans. By definition, soft loans carry
low interest rates. In order to prevent the misuse of resources, it
is preferable that the funds are relent domestically at near market
interest rates. The spread between the original soft loan rate and
the domestic lending rate can include the payment for exchange
rate risk, administrative cost and the "tax" payment to the general
revenue of the national government.
In the medium term, it is important for the tax system to be
restructured to rely primarily on income and wealth taxes. During
the 1970's and the current crisis much of the increase in govern-
ment tax revenues came from specific taxes, import tariffs, and
export taxes and levies. These forms of taxes are distortionary and
often bear more heavily on the poor than on the rich.
Ii. TRADE POLICY AND THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR
It is already well documented that the import tariff and export
tax structures favored heavily the import competing nonagricultural
I. In disposing manyof the government enterpries, however,the govern-
ment mustseriouslytakeinto con°sideration the dangerthat thesaleof these
enterprises will increase theconcentration of resources andeconomic powerin
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industries (especially consumer goods manufactures) and were
strongly biased against agriculture and agricultural trade (see Table
1). The bias in the tariff structure has been in place since the 1950's.
It reflects an industrialization strategy that is based on artificially
raising the prices of manufactured goods and reducing the prices of
food and raw materials to increase the profitability of the industrial
sector.
With the inclusion of the effects of the exchange rate policy, a
recent study indicates that the exchange rate and trade policies
during the 1970's became even more biased against agricultural ex-












AVERAGE EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES* (P/S)
1950-59 1960-69 1970-80
Traditional exports 2.00 3.07 6.60
New exports 2.29 3.70 8.02
All Imports 2.60 5.91 11.72
Nonessential consumer
good imports 3.65 10.56 25.46
Source: Bautista (1984).
*Exchange rate adjusted for differential transaction cost, taxes and subsidies.400 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
The government started a gradual reduction of the levels and dis-
persion of the tariff rates in 1981. In addition, it gradually lifted
quantitative restrictions. The objective of a more uniform tariff sys-
tem is to reduce the variation of the effective protection ratesamong
industries. This would reduce inefficiences in the allocation of re-
sourcesdue to a very uneven effective protection structure. However,
the crisisreversedthe trade liberalization process.Additional tariffs
and taxes were imposed. Foreign exchangewas prioritized, with vir-
tually no allocation for consumer goods manufactures. Thus, the
domestic import substitutes became more protected while exports
became more penalized. These measureswere instituted during an
economic emergency. After the Crisis,the processof tariff rate re-
duction and uniformity will haveto be resumedin order that the bias
in the tariff structure against agricultureand agricultural trade could
be minimized.
The role of the nonagricultural sector. Although not very ob-
vious, agricultural growth and welfare in the ruralsector are dragged
down by a sluggishnonagricultural (especiallymanufacturing)sector.
The linkage is very apparent in the function of the nonagricultural
sector as (1) a provider of inputs to agriculture, (2) a processorof
agricultural products, and (3) a potential demander of the rural labor
pool. Thus, for example, productivity growth in manufacturing
which reducesthe pricesof manufactures reducesproduction costsin
agriculture; in contrast, negligible productivity growth, coupled with
protection from imports, increases the price of agricultural inputs.
An anomaly in the Philippine economic experience during the
1970's and early 1980's is worth emphasizing: Despite the high
growth of agricultural production during the past decade (certainly
one of the higher rates internationally), the Philippines experienced
declines in real wagesin agriculture (see, e.g., NEDA 1984, Table
4.3). This is because, on top of the comparatively high population
growth rate, the sluggishness of the manufacturing sector failed to
"mop up" the rural labor pool.
The Philippines had the worst industrial performance amongthe
ASEAN countries during the 1970's. The averageannual growth rate
of manufacturing haslargelysputtered since 1979, averagingonly 3.5
percent per annum. More importantly, total productivity growth in
the manufacturing sector during 1971-80 wasnegative. This decline
in total productivity explains in partthe failure of the-manufacturingINTAL; MACROECONOMIC POLICY ENVIRONMENT 401
sector to grow faster and its vulnerability to shortages in input sup-
plies (Hooley 1984, p. 36).
The sluggishnessand declining productivity in the manufacturing
sector is disturbing because it indicates that the agricultural sector
again carried the economy on its back during the 1970's as it did
during much of the 1950's and i960's. This indirect agricultural sub-
sidy of the manufacturing secto_brovides a sharp commentary on
the failure of the country's industrial policy and suggeststhat agricul-
tural economists and policymakers need to worry also about the non-
agricultural sector when they examine the problems and prospects of
the agricultural sector.
The tariff structure that was heavily biasedtoward import substi-
tution in consumer goods and against backward integration and pro-
duction for export was a primary reason for the sluggishnessof the
manufacturing sector and the unsatisfactory growth in productivity.
Becauseof the bias against backward integration, the increased in-
vestment expenditures during the 1970's failed to generate substan-
tial domestic multiplier effects - much of it was siphoned off into
increased imports. In fact, Hooley found that the tariff structure
encouraged "... substitution of intermediate goods for both capital
and labor. The result, in many industries, was avoracious demand for
intermediate production, much of it importBd, which helped create a
foreign exchange bottleneck for all industry" (Hooley 1984, p. 55).
The remarkable growth in the grossvalue of exports of garments,
semiconductors, and other electrical and electronic parts during the
1970's shows where the country's comparative advantage in manu-
facturing currently lies and points out the need to change the
country's industrial incentive structure. The performance of gar-
ments and semiconductors proved that the country could do better
by making fuller use of its abundant labor resources or, in other
words, by drying up the labor surplus asfast aspossible, rather than
by trying to "leapfrog" into large, capital intensive industries so
soon. What allowed the remarkable growth of garments and semi-
conductors during the 1970's d_pite the overall industrial incentive
structure, however, was the creation, in effect, of an "enclave"
through bonded warehouses. That is why the import component of
garments and semiconductors was high and there has been little
spillover effect on the rest of the manufacturing sector.
It appears that one :ragedy of the manufacturing sector is that
the overall industrial incentive structure discouraged increased articu-402 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
lation between industries in the sector. Some subsectors are linked
with the rest of the world more than with the rest of the sector. The
policy-induced creation of "enclaves" in order to allow some indus-
tries (garments, semiconductors) to grow is fundamentally a second
best solution compared with the reduction in differential biases in
incentives (tariffs and fiscal) between industries, together with a
more appropriate relative pricirl_ of factors of production and a
greater policy focus on raising productivity.
As in agriculture, the macroeconomic policy environment most
conducive to sustained industrial growth and productivity requires
flexibility in interest rates and exchange rates combined with a less
expansionary financial policy. Perhaps more than in agriculture,
lower tariffs and less dispersion of tariff rates would encourage effi-
ciency and productivity in the manufacturing sector.
III. THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT
One salient characteristic of the Philippine policy experience
during the 1970's was the very active role that the government
played in the economy, The increased government involvement in
the economy was rooted in the activist government ideology of the
New Society that was established in conjunction with the imposition
of martial law in 1972. 2 What appear to have provided the push for
this activist ideology, by allowing increased expenditures and a bigger
government bureaucracy (including government enterprises) or by
presumably necessitating increased government intervention, include
the following; (1) the surge in government revenues during 19"/3-
"/4 resulting largely from the world commodity price boom; (2) the
availability of foreign loans which provided the impetus for theex-
pansion of government bureaucracy and programs after the slacken-
ing of the growth of government revenues since 1975; and (3) the
increased instability in the world economy (as indicated by the in-
creased variability of the country's export and import prices) which,
2. As one indication, Pres. Marcos wrote, "My commitment to a compre-
hensive reform program for the New SocietY includes the formulation of a
dynamic government expenditure policy to serve asan effective tool for devel-
opment and growth . . . There had beena noticeable increasein the magnitudes
of government spending, reflecting the increased commitments that I have
placedupon the nation-building through the budget" (Marcos1976, p. 69).INTAL: MACROECONOMIC POLICY ENVIRONMENT 403
because the macroeconomic price environment was not very satis-
factory, increasedthe pressuresfor government intervention in indi-
vidual industriesor sectors.
Recent experience and commentaries indicate that the govern-
ment intervention in the economy has gone too far and needsto be
reduced. This doesnot mean that the government should not inter-
vene in the economy at all. What is needed is to consider carefully
the extent, form, and focus of government intervention in the econ-
omy.
This raises the issueof what are the "proper" roles of the govern-
ment in the economy. The three widely accepted roles of the govern-
ment are (1) the provision of the so-called "public goods" (e.g., a
legal system, roads, ports) which the market system cannot provide
sufficiently and efficiently; (2) the use of tax transfer mechanisms
for income and asset redistribution; and (3) the regulation of eco-
nomic activity both in the macroeconomic senseof, say, reviving the
economy in the caseof recession,and in the microeconomic senseof
adjusting for the failings of the market system arising from techno-
logy or market size limitations (e.g., pollution, public utilities).
A fourth role being attributed to the government, although of
long historical standing, is less accepted and analytically shakier.
This role is that of "public entrepreneurship"; that is, the presumed
catalytic role that government agenciesand (especially) government
enterprises play in the growth and industrialization process. Public
entrepreneurship is amajor contributor to the increased role of the
Philippine government in the economy during the 1970's.
The public entrepreneurship argument for government interven-
tion is analogous to the infant industry argument for tariff protec-
tion of (private) domestic manufactures. Like indiscriminate and ex-
cessive tariff protection, however, indiscriminate public entrepre-
neurship breeds inefficiency and-resource misallocation. Unlike tariff
protectioni however, indiscriminate public entrepreneurship has the
additional burden of further increasing commodity prices or interest
rates.This arises when the losses of government enterprises are
financed through government budget deficits which need to be
financed by money supply creation or by increasedgovernment bor-
rowing from the private domestic sector. As noted earlier, public
enterprise losseswere a major contributor to the government deficits
of the early 1980's.
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enterprises. The exercise should lead to some rationalization of the
public enterprise set (including a reduction in number) and to a deep-
er understanding of the causes and effects of their proliferation
during the 1970's and early 1980's (in order to prevent their indis-
criminate proliferation again).
Research. One "public good" that the government should have
provided more, but has not, is research and extension. Technology
development, which calls for research and extension, is needed
before agricultural development becomes a vigorous and sustained
leading sector of national development. Research - agronomic and
socioeconomic - is the best and ultimately cheapest way to be com-
petitive internationally and to generate (and maintain) food self-
sufficiency.
Table 3 shows that agricultural research expenditures as a per-
centage of the agricultural value added in the Philippines in 1980 was
the lowest of the 15 countries. The Philippines registered the lowest
rate of growth of agricultural research expenditures (in real terms)
during 1970-80. In addition, it had a comparatively low growth rate
of scientific staff during 1970-80. Finally, the table also indicates
that the country's scientists are paid lower compared with other
LDC scientists. The comparatively low salariesof Philippine scientists
has the insidious effect of making it difficult to hold them in the
country.
The adverse impact of the relative neglect of agricultural research
in the Philippines can be illustrated by the following two examples.
Rice research has not been a top priority of government research
funding institutions; thus, funding for rice research has been espe-
cially meager. As a result, the Philippines undertook only meager
research on other rice varieties that can be better suited to Philippine
conditions and input availabilities. Another example, the recent suc-
cess of Malaysia in propagating a higher-yielding-palm tree (using
tissue culture) can be expected to reduce further the competitiveness
of Philippine coconut in the world oil market. Given that producti-
vity increases reduce prices and given that palm oil is the closest
competitor of coconut oil, the medium term outlook for Philippine
coconuts would be secularly declining prices and a lower Philippine
share in the world vegetable oil market (Barker 1985).
Because of the Ioc,_tional specificitY of crops, Philippine agricul-
tural growth (perhaps more than industrial growth) requires a vigo-Table3 __
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH
RESOURCES,1980 •
Country Agriculturalresearch No. of Postgraduates Growth rate Growth rate
expenditureas Scientists as% of total of staff of research expenditures o m
%of agricultural researchers (1970/80) in constant 8
valueadded 1975 U.S.$1970/80 z O
(in %) :_
Brazil 1.i5 2,957 57 7.49 20.24
Argentina t .64 1;064 27 1.05 7.90 r-
|ndia O.29 7,103 29 2.25 6.53 -<
Nigeria 0.70 1,084 25 17.27 19.95 m Z
Mexico 0.65 1,269 3t 5.t6 33.54 -<
Colombia 0.67 333 55 -6.23 3.34 o z
tndonesia 0.44 1,473 5 14.78 20.01 m
Malaysia 0.81 822 n.a. 21.90 8.49 z -4
Venezuela 1.32 365 31 3.55 12.14
Korea, Rep. 0.23 960 20 2.67 2.65
Bangladesh 0.48 1,642 77 33.32 36..96
Thailand 0.26 1,525 | 6 ]4.16 6.19
Pakistan 0.41 2,900 56 n.a. n.a.
Kenya 1.08 400 89 6.48 27.41
Philippines 0.16 1,050 59 3.19 0.48
Note: The countries are ranked according to the teveI of agricultural research expenditures in 1980.
Brazil spent the most, U,S.$160 million. ._ o
Source: ISNAR and fFPRI, 1981 Tables 4, I and Annex 2-A. tn406 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
rous domestic research community. Furthermore, because much of
agricultural reseach is not patentable or cannot be internalized by
firms, government support of agricultural research is necessary.
Public Administrotion. Although not strictly a "public good,"
one form of "intervention" which the government should do more is
improved public administration and a more responsive administrative
structure/mechanism. Toward this end, there is a need for a decen-
tralization of government decision making as, for example, in infras-
tructure. This could reduce bureaucratic red tape, allow local govern-
ments to decide on what infrastructure is needed in their localities
even if the key technical expertise may come from Manila, and in-
crease the flexibility of local governments/bodies in dealing with
distinctly local issues and concerns. In order that decentralization
could become more effective, it would be advisable for the local
bodies/governments to handle and control a larger portion of the
total government budget than they now have.
A related need is for policy delinkage. That is, there is a need to
minimize the tie-in of the implicit taxing power of some national
government entities with the supposed developmental function of
the entities. It would be better for explicit and implicit taxation to
be done within the framework of the overall tax program of the
government. Similarly, it would be better for the budgetary alloca-
tion to be undertaken within the context of the overall expenditure
program of the government.
Another related issue is the government's mechanism of re-
lending foreign-sourced funds. Currently, there are agencies other
than the Central Bank, public banks, and private financial institu-
tions through which foreign-sourced funds (soft loans) are coursed
(e.g., TRC). It is doubtful whether it is efficacious at all to turn
some government agencies into quasi-financial institutions. Further-
more, to the extent that the soft loans carry interest rates much
lower than prevailing market rates and the agencies do not tie their
lending rates to the prevailing market rates, the government agencies
can be expected to be faced with pressures to allocate the funds to
"favored borrowers" even if the projects are marginal based on the
prevailing market interest rates. It would be better if such foreign
loans were coursed through the Central Bank to be on-lent through
the financial system or were coursed through some link with the
(hopefully less cumbersome) general budget process.
Pump priming. One impact of the current policy framework andINTAL: MACROECONOMIC POLICY ENVIRONMENT 407
the IMF-imposed conditions is that the government cannot do pump
priming operations. An orthodox Keynesian policy prescription is
that the government und_:rtakes pump priming (through increased
expenditures and by incurring government deficits) in order to pull
the economy out of a recession. Given the ceilings on the govern-
ment deficit'imposed by IMF, the government appears to have very
limited options to stimulate aggregate demand. In addition, given
the high interest rates which have dampened investment demand and
given the relatively slow growth in exports, it seemsthat there is no
built-in mechanism under the current policy framework to pull the
economy out of the recession.
In the light of the above considerations, it appearstherefore that
the call madeearlier .inthe paper for further reduction of the govern-
ment deficit is counterproductive in the sense that the economy
would go into deeper recession becauseof the reduction in aggregate
demand. This conclusion is, however, not warranted. In this regard,
the proposals for "taxing" foreign soft loans or "confiscation" of
properties abroad of absconding Filipinos are very relevant. This is
Joecause with these revenuesthe government can havea more expan-
sionary monetary policy stance vis-a-visthe private sector (through a
reduction in interest rates) without overshooting aggregatemonetary
targets. Similarly, the extra revenues, if substantial, can allow a
reduction in domestic income and indirect taxes (say, the gasoline
tax), thereby increasing after-tax personal incomes. In either case,
private domestic spending (investment and/or consumption) is en-
couraged. Thus, pump priming is possible albeit via a different route.
In addition, this policy package would increase the share of the
private sector in the national economy in contrast to the traditional
meanswhich tend to reduce the private sector's share.
Final Remarks
A sustained healthy growth in agriculture requires a sustained
healthy growth in the macroeconomy. It is towards this end that
policy directions aresuggestedin this paper.
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